Book by Murray Williamson Scales Jr Robert H
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Críticas:
Murray and Scales are serious military historians [and] have a knack for integrating tactical vignettes into their operational narrative . . . Details like these give the reader a bit of the taste and smell of the fighting. More important, [the authors] use them adroitly to highlight factors that shaped the thinking of American military commanders at key stages and to point out critical lessons about the conduct of modern war . . . What emerges from their book is a far more comprehensive view of a far more complicated war than the vast majority of readers may have gleaned from the snapshots provided by the news media during the 23 days of major combat operations.--Kenneth M. Pollack "New York Times Book Review "
Reseña del editor:
Two of America's most distinguished military historians go beyond the blaring headlines, embedded videophone reports and Centcom briefings to analyze events in light of past military experience, present battleground realities and future expectations. The Iraq War puts the recent conflict into context. Drawing on their extensive military expertise, the authors assess the opposing aims of the Coalition forces and the Iraqi regime and explain the day-to-day tactical and logistical decisions of infantry and air command, as British and American troops moved into Basra and Baghdad. They simultaneously step back to examine long-running debates within the US Defense Department about the proper uses of military power and probe the strategic implications of those debates for America's buildup to this war. Surveying the immense changes that have occurred in America's armed forces between the Gulf conflicts of 1991 and 2003 - changes in doctrine as well as weapons - this volume reveals critical meanings and lessons about the new "American way of war" as it has unfolded in Iraq. Williamson Murray offers his insight as principal author of the operations volume of the Gulf War Air Power Survey, commissioned after the 1991 conflict in Kuwait. Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr., US Army retired, brings perspective as head of the Army's team of Gulf War historians. He also served as Commandant of the Army War College.
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- EditorialHarvard University Press
- Año de publicación2003
- ISBN 10 0674012801
- ISBN 13 9780674012806
- EncuadernaciónTapa dura
- Número de páginas256
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Valoración
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3,81
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